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Keynes’s dynamic, open-end approach to money-wage flexibility is contrasted with the 
subsequent rehabilitation of the static analysis of the problem, which has led to the 
‘closure’ of the Keynesian system and the vindication of the economy’s capacity for self-
adjustment. Not even in static analysis, it is further maintained, can money-wage flexibility 
be counted on to bring about a rise in aggregate demand and employment. For the flaws in 
the logical basis of the decreasing relationship between the demand for capital and the rate 
of interest undermine the ‘Keynes effect,’ so that the AD curve  predominantly governed 
by the deflation-induced redistribution of real wealth from debtors to creditors  assumes 
an upward-sloping shape at all price levels. As against the claim that after a sufficiently 
long period of time the ‘Pigou,’ or ‘real balance’ effect, will prevail over the above 
redistribution (or ‘reverse Pigou’) effect, it is contended that long-lasting excess capacity 
and unemployment will cause both the productive capacity installed to shrink and 
‘discouraged’ workers to leave the labour market. Unemployment may thus disappear 
through an entirely different road than those envisaged by believers in the self-adjusting 
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 PRICE AND PREJUDICE 
The statics and dynamics of money-wage flexibility 
Annamaria Simonazzi and Fernando Vianello* 
 
Introduction 
 In the last decade of the twentieth century concern over the havoc 
wrought by deflation in Japan and the threat of contagion of ‘nipponitis’ to 
other developed economies aroused new interest in deflation as a theoretical 
subject, but does not appear to have undermined the reassuring belief  
(‘prejudice’) that, as a rule, money-wage flexibility (‘price’) can be counted 
on to make the economic system self-adjusting.1 To tell the story of how the 
above belief, peculiar to ‘classical’ economics, survived Keynes’s critique is 
among the aims of the present paper. 
 The idea put forward by Keynes in chapter 19 of the General Theory 
 partly relying on his own and Irving Fisher’s previous analyses of 
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1 Since Krugman (1998), responsibility for the disruptive consequences of the Japanese 
deflation has frequently been blamed upon the operation of the ‘liquidity trap’ (rescuing 
this concept from the oblivion to which it had been condemned since the inflationary 
1970s), rather than upon deflation as such. Thus a special section on deflation-induced 
stagnation in Japan has been inserted in latest-vintage textbooks (see, e. g., Blanchard, 
2003), while retaining the idea that under normal conditions falling money wages and 
prices, far from being harmful to the economy, cause it to move down along a well-behaved 
AD function. 
 
deflation  is that under money-wage flexibility any departure from full 
employment would trigger a cumulative fall in prices and aggregate 
demand. What makes the real-world economy stable is indeed, in his 
opinion, the circumstance that money wages do not fall without limit as long 
as labour supply exceeds labour demand.  
 Some aspects of Keynes’s (1923) and Fisher’s (1932, 1933) analyses 
of deflation will be examined in section 1 as a preliminary to the 
reconstruction  offered in section 2  of Keynes’s (1936) treatment of 
money-wage flexibility. Fisher’s and Keynes’s approaches, it will be 
pointed out in the above sections, are dynamic in nature, in the sense that 
both authors are concerned with the fall in (money wages and) prices as a 
process.  
 In section 3 we shall illustrate a scarcely noticed aspect of Keynes’s 
position, namely, its open-endedness as far as the final outcome of the 
deflationary process is concerned. A critical appraisal of the subsequent 
rehabilitation of the static analysis of money-wage flexibility  with its 
accompanying ‘closure’ of the Keynesian system, and vindication of the 
economy’s capacity for self-adjustment  will be provided in section 4.  
 Not even in static analysis, it will be contended in the next two 
sections, can money-wage flexibility be reckoned to bring about a rise in 
aggregate demand and employment. The reader will be firstly reminded, in 
section 5, that the logical basis of the decreasing relationship between the 
demand for capital (as a stock and as a flow) and the rate of interest has 
been recognized to be flawed. As a consequence, it has been pointed out in 
Garegnani (1978-79), what has become known as the ‘Keynes effect’2 falls 
to the ground. This being so  we shall maintain in section 6  the 
deflation-induced redistribution of real wealth from debtors to creditors will 
result in a completely (rather than partly, as in Tobin, 1978) upward-sloping 
AD curve.  
 As against the claim that the ‘Pigou,’ or ‘real balance’ effect (as 
called in Patinkin, 1948 and 1956, respectively) will eventually get the 
upper hand over the above redistribution (or ‘reverse Pigou’) effect, we 
shall maintain in section 7 that whenever the task of causing aggregate 
demand to rise is assigned to a mechanism which takes a considerable time 
to produce its effects, a further difficulty arises. For long-lasting excess 
capacity will cause the productive capacity installed (which Keynes was 
taking as given) to shrink. Moreover, persistent unemployment will 
probably result in ‘discouraged’ workers leaving the labour market. 
Unemployment may thus disappear through an entirely different road than 
those envisaged by believers in the self-adjusting properties of the economic 
system.  
 
1. Fisher and Keynes on deflation  
 In Keynes’s Tract on Monetary Reform, published in the aftermath 
of the severe post-World War I deflation, a fall in prices is said to effect a 
redistribution of real wealth from those ‘who make the decisions which set 
                                                 
2 ‘By the Keynes-effect I mean the hypothesis, granted by Keynes, that an increase in the 
supply of money, measured in stable purchasing power and caused by falling prices, 
reduces the rate of interest and thereby favourably influences the volume of investment’ 
(Haberler 1958, p. 491, note 3).  
  
production in motion’ to those ‘who are inactive once they have lent their 
money’ (Keynes, 1923, p. 30). In chapter 4, section 1 of the Tract a debt is 
acknowledged, in this connection, to Irving Fisher’s article ‘Devaluation 
versus Deflation,’ published in one of the ‘Reconstruction in Europe’ 
supplements to The Manchester Guardian Commercial, of which Keynes 
was the editor (11th supplement, 7 December 1922). The title of the section 
is the same as that of Fisher’s article.  
 Some ten years later observation of the disaster caused by falling 
prices in the Great Depression led Fisher to elaborate his celebrated Debt-
Deflation Theory of the Great Depressions (Fisher, 1933; see also 1932). 
According to this theory, over-indebtedness, which (together with the over-
investment and over-speculation it makes possible) characterizes the later 
stages of a boom, ‘will tend to lead to liquidation, through the alarm either 
of debtors or creditors or both’ (Fisher, 1933, pp. 341-42), thus triggering a 
chain of repercussions including ‘distress selling;’ ‘contraction in deposit 
currency, as bank loans are paid off;’ ‘a slowing down of velocity of 
circulation;’ ‘a fall in the level of prices;’ ‘a still greater fall in the net worth 
of business, precipitating bankruptcies;’ ‘a like fall in profits,’ which causes 
‘a reduction in output, in trade and in employment of labour.’ Falling 
profits, bankruptcies and unemployment give rise to ‘pessimism and loss of 
confidence.’ (ibid., p. 342).3 
                                                 
3 It may be observed, en passant, that  although Fisher’s analysis is conducted on the 
basis of the quantity theory of money  the fall in prices can be conceived of as the 
consequence of nothing but the ‘distress selling’ of products aimed at raising the money 
required to pay off debt, thus making reference to the quantity theory of money 
unnecessary. 
 
 The fall in prices, Fisher contends, will cause not only ‘a rise in the 
real, or commodity, rates’ (in spite of the accompanying ‘fall in the nominal, 
or money, rates’) (ibid., p. 342), but also a rise in the real debt to be paid off. 
Thus, 
  
deflation caused by the debt reacts on the debt. Each dollar of debt still 
unpaid becomes a bigger dollar, and if the over-indebtedness with which we 
started was great enough, the liquidation of debt cannot keep up with the fall 
of prices which it causes. In that case, liquidation defeats itself. While it 
diminishes the number of dollars owed, it may not do so as fast as it 
increases the value of each dollar owed... The more the debtors pay, the 
more they owe. The more the economic boat tips, the more it tends to tip. It 
is not tending to right itself, but is capsizing (ibid., 1933, p. 344). 
 
Although no reference to the above analysis can be found in Keynes’s 
General Theory, the rise in the real burden of debt plays a key role in his 
account of the consequences of deflation. ‘Indeed if the fall of... prices goes 
far,’ he observes, ‘the embarrassment of those entrepreneurs who are 
heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 
264). The consequent inability to carry out investment and production plans4 
will adversely affect aggregate demand and the expectation of future yield 
from capital assets, thus causing the willingness to invest, too, to fade away.   
 In the Tract Keynes draws attention not only to the consequences of 
an actual fall in prices, but also to those of an expected fall. ‘During the 
lengthy process of production,’ he observes,  
 
                                                 
4 As pointed out in Keynes (1931), the fall in the price of assets, which takes place as a part 
of the general process of deflation, is also liable to cause serious embarrassment of the 
banks, with negative repercussions on their lending policy.  
 
the business world is incurring outgoings in terms of money  paying out in 
money for wages and other expenses of production  in the expectation of 
recouping this outlay by disposing of the product for money at a later date... 
Now, it follows from this that if prices are expected to fall... entrepreneurs 
will be reluctant to embark on lengthy productive processes involving a 
money outlay long in advance of money recoupment  hence 
unemployment (Keynes, 1923, pp. 33-34). 
 
The same ‘monetary’ approach to the problem5 is to be found in the General 
Theory, where the marginal efficiency of a capital asset is said to result from 
the sum of money to be spent on its purchase and the money yield expected 
from its employment in production. Given the schedule of the marginal 
efficiency of capital, investment will be pushed to the point where the 
marginal efficiency of capital equals the (long-term) nominal rate of 
interest. An implication of this is that 
 
The expectation of a fall in the value of money stimulates investment, and 
hence employment, because it raises the schedule of the marginal efficiency 
of capital, i.e. the investment demand schedule; and the expectation of a rise 
in the value of money is depressing, because it lowers the schedule of the 
marginal efficiency of capital (ibid., pp. 141-2). 
 
This, Keynes asserts, is ‘the truth behind Professor Irving Fisher’s... 
distinction between the money rate of interest and the real rate of interest’ 
(ibid., p. 142). Fisher is, however, wrong  
                                                 
5 In the preparatory notes for The Monetary Theory of Production  this being the original 
title of what was to become The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money  
Keynes makes the point that Marx was right in pointing out that ‘the nature of production in 
the actual world is not, as economists seem often to suppose, a case of C-M-C’, i.e. of 
exchanging commodity (or effort) for money in order to obtain another commodity (or 
effort). That may be the standpoint of the private consumer. But this is not the attitude of 
business, which is a case of M-C-M’, i.e. of parting with money for commodity (or effort) 
in order to obtain more money’ (Keynes, 1932, pp. 81). 
 
 
in supposing that it is the rate of interest on which prospective changes in 
the value of money will directly react, instead of the marginal efficiency of 
a given stock of capital (ibid., p. 142). 
 
 Widely shared as it is, this reading of Fisher’s position should be 
qualified to the effect that in his view the adjustment of the money rate of 
interest to inflation or deflation takes a considerable time, during which the 
real rate (‘so light in the way up and so heavy in the way down’; Fisher, 
1932, p. 107) changes pro-cyclically (see Tobin, 1985, p. 36 and 1987, p. 
375)  this being in fact an important aspect of his theory of business 
cycles, as expounded in Fisher (1923) and (1925), as also of his account of 
the dynamics of the Great Depression (Fisher, 1932, 1933).6 Needless to 
say, the above qualification makes Fisher’s view of the impact of (expected) 
deflation on investment less far from Keynes’s than the latter was prepared 
to concede.  
 
§ 2. Keynes’s case against money-wage flexibility 
 In the General Theory the arguments reviewed in section 1 above 
come into consideration as part of a more general argument, aimed at 
showing that the fall in money wages cannot be relied upon as a means to 
reach full employment. The latter argument is conducted in two stages. It is 
firstly contended (in chapter 2) that, if aggregate demand remains 
unchanged, employment and the real wage (equal to the marginal 
productivity of labour) remain unchanged, too; this amounts to saying that a 
                                                 
6 As will be recalled, reference to falling prices causing ‘a rise in the real, or commodity, 
rates’ is made in a passage from Fisher (1933) quoted earlier in this section. 
 
fall in money wages has no other effect than to cause money prices to fall in 
the same proportion. Subsequently (in chapter 19) it is contended that the 
fall in money wages and prices is ineffective in causing aggregate demand 
to rise  and is, indeed, a source of instability. (In chapters 3 to 18 money 
wages are assumed to remain constant. ‘But this simplification,’ Keynes 
warns his readers, ‘is introduced solely to facilitate the exposition. The 
essential character of the argument is precisely the same whether or not 
money wages... are liable to change;’ Keynes, 1936, p. 27.)  
  The only way in which a fall in money wages and prices can affect 
aggregate demand, Keynes submits in chapter 19, is through its effects on 
the three ‘independent variables’ (ibid., p. 245) of his system  the 
marginal propensity to consume, the schedule of the marginal efficiency of 
capital and the rate of interest (see ibid., p. 260). Now, as far as the marginal 
propensity to consume is concerned, the influence of the redistribution of 
real income (mainly from entrepreneurs to rentiers) operated by a fall in 
money wages and prices ‘is more likely to be adverse than favourable’ 
(ibid., p. 262). A further transmission mechanism explored by Keynes goes 
from a fall in money wages and prices to a fall in the demand for money and 
in the rate of interest, and from the latter to a rise in investment. To rely on 
this mechanism (the ‘Keynes effect’) would, however, be wrong, in 
Keynes’s opinion, for two independent reasons. The first reason is that the 
long-term rate of interest may prove poorly sensitive to increases in the 
quantity of money in terms of the wage-unit. The second is that falling 
money wages and prices adversely affect the marginal efficiency of capital. 
 As far as the rate of interest is concerned, Keynes makes the point 
that  
 
Just as a moderate increase in the quantity of money may exert an 
inadequate influence over the long-term rate of interest, whilst an 
immoderate increase may offset its other advantages by its disturbing effects 
on confidence; so a moderate reduction in money-wages may prove 
inadequate, whilst an immoderate reduction might shatter confidence even if 
it were practicable (ibid., pp. 266-67). 
 
We are thus referred back to chapters 13 and 15 of the book, where the 
efficacy of an increase in the quantity of money in forcing down the rate of 
interest is discussed. In chapter 13 Keynes submits that     
 
a large increase in the quantity of money may cause so much uncertainty 
about the future that liquidity-preferences due to the precautionary motive 
may be strengthened; whilst opinion about the future of the rate of interest 
may be so unanimous that a small change in present rates may cause a mass 
movement into cash (ibid., p. 172). 
 
 Near-unanimity of opinion is treated as the normal case in chapter 
15, where the rate of interest is described as a ‘highly conventional’ 
phenomenon, and its actual value is said to be ‘largely governed by the 
prevailing view as to what its value is expected to be’ (ibid., p. 203). While 
‘The short-term rate of interest is easily controlled by the monetary 
authorities,’ Keynes contends, ‘the long-term rate may prove more 
recalcitrant’ (ibid., p. 203)  and may even ‘fluctuate for decades about a 
level which is chronically too high for full employment’ (ibid, p. 204). A 
few lines below we read: 
 
The difficulty in the way of maintaining effective demand at a level high 
enough to provide full employment, which ensues from the association of a 
conventional and fairly stable long-term rate of interest with a fickle and 
highly unstable marginal efficiency of capital, should be, by now, obvious 
to the reader (ibid., p. 204). 
 
Needless to say, the above difficulty is bound to become much greater if the 
task of forcing down the rate of interest is to be assigned to the fall in 
money wages and prices, rather than to the ‘persistence and consistency of 
purpose of the monetary authority’ (ibid., p. 204).  
 Let us now turn to the second of the two reasons, referred to above, 
why Keynes holds that the ‘Keynes effect’ does not work. His position, as 
reconstructed in section 1 above, is that while the actual fall in prices causes 
the real burden of debt to increase, thus bringing about financial distress and 
bankruptcies, their expected fall undermines the profitability of investment.7 
To this it must now be added that in Keynes’s opinion the actual fall in 
prices will normally generate the expectation of a further fall (see ibid., pp. 
263 and 265; see also section 4 below). It follows that, even in the event that 
a fall in (money wages and) prices is capable of forcing down the rate of 
interest, any favourable effect this may be expected to have on investment is 
likely to be outweighed by ‘the schedule of the marginal efficiency of 
capital... falling more rapidly than the rate of interest’ (ibid., p. 173).  
 Joint consideration of the above two reasons leads Keynes to 
conclude that 
 
                                                 
7 A further consequence of the expectation of a fall in prices is ‘the postponement of both 
investment and consumption’ (ibid., p. 263). 
if labour were to respond to conditions of gradually diminishing 
employment by offering its services at a gradually diminishing monetary 
wage, this would not, as a rule, have the effect of reducing real wages and 
might even have the effect of increasing them, through its adverse influence 
on the volume of output (ibid., p. 269).  
 
This being so, it is obvious that in the real-world economy the stickiness of 
money wages (to be distinguished from their assumed constancy) plays the 
all-important role of preventing unemployment from setting in motion a 
disruptive deflationary process.   
  
§ 3. Alternative resting places 
 Suppose, however, that money wages were flexible. What would the 
final outcome of the deflationary process be like? The problem is touched 
upon incidentally in a handful of passages, scattered in different chapters of 
the General Theory. Workers, we find it stated in chapter 18,  
 
will not seek a much greater money-wage when employment improves or 
allow a very great reduction rather than suffer any unemployment at all... 
whether or not this conclusion is plausible a priori, experience shows that 
some such psychological law must actually hold. For if competition between 
unemployed workers always led to a very great reduction of the money-
wage,  there would be a violent instability in the price-level. Moreover, 
there might be no position of stable equilibrium except in conditions 
consistent with full employment; since the wage-unit might have to fall 
without limit until it reached a point where the effect of the abundance of 
money in terms of the wage-unit was sufficient to restore full employment. 
At no other point could there be a resting place (ibid., p. 253). 
 
The foregoing passage appears to suggest that the continuous growth in the 
quantity of money available for satisfying the speculative and precautionary 
motives may eventually sweep away all the obstacles lying in the way of 
full employment. 
 A passage in the Appendix to chapter 14 qualifies the above 
reasoning to the effect that liquidity preference may ‘become absolute,’ thus 
preventing the rate of interest from falling further, before full employment is 
reached:  
 
...in the extreme case where money-wages are assumed to fall without limit 
in face of involuntary unemployment through a futile competition for 
employment between the unemployed labourers, there will... be only two 
possible long-period positions  full employment and the level of 
employment corresponding to the rate of interest at which liquidity 
preference becomes absolute (ibid., p. 191). 
 
Reference to liquidity preference becoming absolute is, indeed, ambiguous, 
since such a thing may occur at any level of the rate of interest, provided 
expectations as to the future rate are unanimous (see ibid., p. 172; see also 
section 2 above). What Keynes appears to have in mind here is, however, a 
threshold below which the rate of interest cannot possibly fall. Such a 
‘lower limit,’ we read in a passage from chapter 16, ‘in present 
circumstances may perhaps be as high as 2 or 2½ per cent, on long term’ 
(ibid., p. 219; see also p. 309, note 1). The ‘possibility... that, after the rate 
of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity-preference may become 
virtually absolute’ is also referred to in a passage from chapter 15. Of this 
‘limiting case,’ Keynes observes, ‘I know of no example... hitherto,’ 
although it ‘might become of practical importance in the future’ (ibid., p. 
207).  
 Observe that only the first of the two above-described ‘long period 
positions,’ namely full employment, is described as ‘a stable equilibrium.’ 
In the second  a situation in which the rate of interest has reached its 
lower limit  money wages will continue to fall until (we may imagine) 
they become zero.8 Alternatively, money wages may be thought to become 
zero before the rate of interest has reached its lower limit. Such a possibility 
is contemplated in a passage from chapter 21, where the fall in money prices 
is said to lead to one of three possible ‘resting places:’ full employment, a 
situation in which the rate of interest has reached its lower limit and one in 
which money wages are zero:       
 
If... money-wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a tendency 
for less than full employment... there would be no resting place below full 
employment until either the rate of interest was incapable of falling further 
or wages were zero (ibid., p. 304). 
 
 Keynes’s analysis of the deflationary process is, thus, open-end in 
character. Whether wages become zero before or after the rate of interest 
has reached its lower limit  or whether they stop falling before having 
become zero because full employment is somehow established  will 
depend on exactly how liquidity preference and the inducement to invest 
                                                 
 
8 For a critique of the idea that Keynes proved the possibility of an unemployment 
equilibrium with flexible money wages, see Patinkin (1948), p. 562. ‘What Keynesian 
economics claims,’ he observes, ‘is that the economic system may be in a position of 
underemployment disequilibrium (in the sense that wages, prices and the amount of 
employment are continuously changing over time) for long, even indefinite, periods of 
time’ ( ibid., p. 563; see also Patinkin, 1974, p. 3 and Lejionhufvud 1968, p. 161).   
 
(and to consume) are affected by deflation. And this, in Keynes’s opinion, is 
a matter on which no general rules can be laid down.  
 
4. ‘A world of difference’  
 In order to turn the lower limit to the rate of interest  the ‘liquidity 
trap,’ as it is so often called9  into the only obstacle capable of preventing 
money-wage flexibility from securing full employment, two steps are 
required. The first step consists in removing all the obstacles other than the 
above limit that may prevent a rise in the quantity of money from forcing 
down the rate of interest. This is done by assuming away the disturbing 
effects of unanimity of expectations (for all rates of interest higher than the 
minimum one) and making liquidity preference independent of any change 
that may occur in the quantity of money. The nature and purport of this step 
will be easily grasped by comparing the difficulties Keynes envisages the 
monetary authorities encountering in their attempt to force down the rate of 
interest, described in section 2 above, with the fairly automatic 
consequences of a rise in the quantity of money made possible by the 
perfectly stable, mainly risk-based liquidity-preference function 
contemplated in Hicks (1937) or Modigliani (1944). 
                                                 
9 As for this expression, it may be observed that its inventor, Dennis Robertson, used it in a 
sense that has hardly anything to do with the lower limit to the rate of interest. See 
Robertson (1940), pp. 19 and 34-36. See also Robertson (1936), p. 190. Elsewhere in the 
latter paper Robertson does refer to the lower limit to the rate of interest limit, but only to 
state that it does not stand at the basis of Keynes’s view of the rate of interest as a purely 
monetary phenomenon. (Robertson, 1936, p. 183). 
  
 The second step consists in treating a fall in money wages and prices 
as perfectly equivalent to a rise in the quantity of money. According to 
Modigliani’s well-known formulation, unemployment results from 
 
a basic maladjustment between the quantity of money and the wage rate. It 
is the fact that money wages are too high relative to the quantity of money 
that explains why it is unprofitable to expand employment to the ‘full 
employment’ level (Modigliani, 1944, p. 77).  
 
The view that money wages are sticky is, according to Modigliani, the 
central aspect of Keynes’s position, and the ultimate reason why his 
conclusions differ from those of ‘classical’ economics. If, however, wages 
were flexible, this would correct the ‘basic maladjustment’ no less 
effectively than an increase in the quantity of money. The only case in 
which neither remedy is effective  the case of ‘liquidity trap’  is dubbed 
by Modigliani ‘the Keynesian case’ (ibid., p. 74). The resulting ‘closure’ of 
the Keynesian system can be described as near perfect, since the ‘Keynesian 
case’ is, in Modigliani’s words, ‘the exception and not the rule’ (ibid., p. 
76).  
 As against the equivalence between a fall in money wages and a rise 
in the quantity of money, Keynes had pointed out beforehand that 
 
while a flexible wage policy and a flexible money policy come, analytically, 
to the same thing inasmuch as they are alternative means of changing the 
quantity of money in terms of wage-units, in other respects there is, of 
course, a world of difference between them (Keynes, 1936, p. 267).  
 
In Modigliani’s article one part of this ‘world of difference’  the effects of 
deflation on the financial situation of entrepreneurs  is ignored outright. 
Another part is, instead, explicitly assumed away. ‘In order to simplify our 
task,’ Modigliani writes, 
 
our analysis proceeds in general, under ‘static’ assumptions; this does not 
mean that we neglect time, but that we assume the Hicksian (total) 
‘elasticity of expectation’ to be always unity... Since all the theories we 
examine or formulate in this paper are concerned with the determinants of 
equilibrium and not with the explanation of business cycles, this 
simplification, although it is serious in some respects, does not seem 
unwarranted (Modigliani, 1944, pp. 45-46). 
 
In Hicks’s own words a unity ‘elasticity of expectation’ implies that 
 
a change in current prices will change expected prices in the same direction 
and in the same proportion; if prices were previously expected to be 
constant at the old level, they are now expected to be constant at the new 
level; changes in prices are expected to be permanent (Hicks, 1939, p. 205). 
 
 What the above assumption rules out is both the ‘favourable’ 
contingency in which ‘money wages are believed to have touched the 
bottom, so that further changes are expected to be in the upward direction’ 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 265), and the ‘unfavourable’ contingency in which ‘the 
reduction [in money wages] leads to the expectation... of a further wage-
reduction in prospect’ (ibid., 263). It is, however, the latter contingency that 
Keynes regards as normal ‘under a system of free wage bargaining,’ while 
the former would require the wage reduction to ‘be accomplished by 
administrative decree,’ as may perhaps happen ‘in Italy, Germany or Russia, 
but not in France, the United States or Great Britain’ (ibid., p. 269). 10  
                                                 
10 According to Oskar Lange (1944, p. 83), the ‘very special conditions’ (including 
favourable ‘elasticities of price expectations’) under which ‘price flexibility result[s] in the 
automatic maintenance or restoration of equilibrium of demand and supply of factors of 
  
5. Money-wage flexibility and the investment function 
 In the above discussion it has been taken for granted that investment 
is a decreasing function of the rate of interest. However, in the aftermath of 
World War II this appears to have been far from undisputed. For the 
experience of the 1930s had caused considerable distrust in the efficacy of 
cheap-money policy in fostering investment; and the relevance of rate-of-
interest considerations for investment decisions had been cast doubt on by 
the surveys conducted before the war by the Harvard Business School (see 
Ebersole, 1938) and the Oxford Economists’ Research Group (see Wilson 
and Andrews, eds., 1951; see also Shackle, 1946).  
 As a result, it was not uncommon to find Keynesian authors holding 
that ‘producer expenditures for capital equipment are insensitive to changes 
in the rate of interest’ (Klein, 1947, p. 64) and even criticizing Keynes for 
having made use of ‘the marginal efficiency of investment (itself a first 
cousin of the old productivity concept)’ and the implied notion of a rate of 
                                                                                                                            
production’ may have been ‘approximately realized in the long run during a period which 
extended from the 1840’s until 1914. During this period, price flexibility was a workable 
norm of long-run economic policy. The feeling of stability and security of the economic 
order which permeated this period (with possible exception during the years 1873-1896), 
created a strong belief in a “normal” level of certain economic quantities, including prices. 
Long-range effective price expectations were, therefore, prevailingly inelastic.’ Reference 
to ‘people’s sense of normal prices’ is also made by Hicks (1939, p. 298) as setting ‘a limit 
to the fall in wages’ and encouraging entrepreneurs to think that prices have reached the 
bottom. As far as the latter point (price expectations) is concerned, he observes that ‘when 
prices have fallen to a certain extent, there will be some entrepreneurs... who will begin to 
think that the prices which have now been reached are abnormally low, and will therefore 
begin to develop production plans on the basis of a probability of rising prices in the 
future.’ It is worth emphasizing that what Lange describes as a ‘very special’ state of 
affairs, prevailing under well defined institutional and historical conditions, is treated by 
Hicks as a normal occurrence.        
interest which ‘would call forth a full employment rate of investment’ 
(Musgrave, 1948, p. 79).11 In the same vein, Tobin made the point that 
Modigliani’s ‘Keynesian case’ was by no means the only exception to the 
‘wage-rigidity explanation of unemployment;’ for a zero interest-elasticity 
of the demand for investment ‘would constitute another and very important 
exception’  this consideration being ‘supported by the evidence that 
interest calculations play an insignificant part in business investment 
decisions’ (Tobin, 1947, p. 576 and p. 576, note 1).  
 In the 1950s the findings of the empirical studies carried out in the 
1930s began, however, to come in for critical reappraisal and to be regarded 
as reflecting the special conditions of the Great Depression (see Schlesinger 
1960, pp. 602-3). It was increasingly argued that although investment may 
be less responsive to changes in the rate of interest than is assumed by the 
‘classical’ theory, it is more so than some Keynesians previously held (see 
White, 1956, p. 113). In the end, recognition of a considerable interest-
elasticity of investment became the cornerstone of the new consensus view 
among American economists  aptly described in the fifth edition of Paul 
Samuelson’s textbook as ‘a grand neoclassical synthesis’ (Samuelson,  
1961, p. 403).  
 According to neoclassical theory  accepted by the ‘Classics,’ 
Keynes and the neoclassical synthesis alike  the interest-elasticity of the 
demand for investment, or for capital as a flow, reflects the interest-
elasticity of the demand for capital as a stock, investment being the means 
                                                 
 
11 See Keynes (1936), p. 223, where reference is made to a rate of interest ‘which is 
consistent with full employment.’  
by which the gap between the desired and the existing ‘quantity of capital’ 
is bridged. In the long run the relentless action of the systematic forces 
tending to cause the demand for capital to rise as the rate of interest falls  
the substitutability in production between capital and labour and the 
substitutability in consumption between goods produced with different 
proportions of capital to labour  will easily outweigh, it is maintained, the 
capricious and ephemeral influences which make the marginal efficiency of 
capital ‘fickle and unstable’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 204; quoted more fully in 
section 2 above).  
 However, it has been shown by Sraffa (1960) that the substitutability 
between capital and labour  and, by implication, the substitutability 
between consumer goods produced with different proportions of capital to 
labour  cannot be reckoned to work systematically in the direction 
assumed by the neoclassical theory. Once this is recognized, the familiar 
decreasing relationship between the demand for capital and the rate of 
interest turns out to be devoid of any theoretical ground (see Garegnani, 
1966, 1970 and Samuelson, 1966). And the same is true, as pointed out by 
Garegnani (1978-79), of the relationship between the demand for investment 
and the rate of interest12 (Nor can believers in the existence of such a 
                                                 
 
12 For the derivation of the investment function from the demand function for capital as a 
stock, see Garegnani (1978-79), Part I, section 5. The ‘popular derivation’ of the 
investment schedule based on an array of alternative investment opportunities, and ‘making 
no explicit reference to capital intensity,’ is discussed by Ackley (1961, pp. 472-73, note 6). 
The author shows that the schedule obtained by arraying the investment opportunities from 
the highest return to the lowest for any given rate of interest ‘cannot serve as the basis for 
any theory of investment,’ namely, for an explanation of what happens if the rate of interest 
changes. The point is further elaborated in Bonifati and Vianello (1998), pp. 115-117. See 
also Garegnani (1978-1979), part II, p. 78, note.   
relationship take much comfort from post-World War II empirical studies 
on the subject.)13 The thesis that money-wage flexibility is unable to secure 
full employment through its effects on the rate of interest  argued by 
Keynes on dynamic grounds  is thus reasserted on static grounds, and 
placed on a more comprehensive theoretical basis than the one which 
Keynes himself was able to provide.  
 
6. The ‘Pigou effect’ and the ‘reverse Pigou effect’ 
 Since Patinkin (1948), and its (1951) revised version, the ‘classical’ 
position was, however, increasingly defended on a new static ground: the 
‘Pigou effect,’ the canonical references for which are Haberler (1937)14 and 
Pigou (1943). The transmission mechanism implied  the discouragement 
of saving consequent upon the increase in the real value of the net wealth of 
the private sector denominated in money15  was such as to ensure that 
                                                                                                                            
  
13 Surveys of such studies, made at different points in time, suggest that ‘demand  factors as 
represented by the accelerator are more important than relative prices in determining 
investment’ (Junankar 1972, p. 69), or that ‘on balance, the response of investment to price 
variables tends to be small and unimportant relative to quantity variables’ (Chirinko, 1993, 
p. 1906). According to Hasset and Hubbard (1996), empirical work trying to relate 
investment to the cost of capital has been generally disappointing, in spite of the 
considerable ingenuity devoted to the task of making empirical results conform with the 
‘theoretical high ground;’ recent studies, using micro-data and addressing problems of 
measurement errors and misspecification of adjustment costs, appear to ‘have reached more 
promising results,’ though ‘one should be cautious ... in moving from the microeconomic 
evidence to aggregate predictions’ (p.32).  
 
14 Patinkin’s reference is to the third (1941) edition of Prosperity and Depressions. 
However, as has been pointed out by Laidler (1999, p. 288, n. 10), the relevant passage can 
also be found in the first (1937) edition.  
 
15 Kalecki (1944, p. 132) appears to have been the first to notice that to the extent that 
money ‘is “backed” by credits to persons and firms... to the gain of money holders there 
under money-wage flexibility a full employment equilibrium existed also in 
the cases of an infinite interest-elasticity of the demand for money and of a 
zero interest-elasticity of the demand for investment. 
 In a passage inserted in the 1951 version of Patinkin’s paper it is 
incidentally observed that the ‘Pigou effect’ may be jeopardized by debtors 
being ‘discouraged by a price decline much more than creditors are 
encouraged,’ and that ‘a persistent price decline will cause a wave of 
bankruptcies,’ in most of which ‘creditors also lose’  the author’s 
conclusion being that only ‘further investigation’ will tell us whether a price 
decline does indeed have a positive net effect on total expenditure (see 
Patinkin, 1951, p. 263). Similar considerations stand at the basis of Tobin’s 
‘reverse Pigou effect’ (Tobin, 1978, p. 15). As against the fashionable 
assumption that ‘agents are all alike’ (ibid., p. x), Tobin  observes that 
‘Debtors are debtors because they have high propensities to spend’ (Tobin, 
1975, p. 197), be it for consumption or investment purposes. It follows, he 
contends, that the redistribution of real wealth operated by deflation causes 
the propensity to spend of the community to fall.16  
 The consequences of money-wage flexibility are analysed by Tobin 
by combining the ‘reverse Pigou effect’ with the ‘Keynes effect’. While the 
‘Keynes effect’ works in the conventional direction, shifting the LM curve 
                                                                                                                            
corresponds an equal loss of the bank debtors.’ We leave aside the question, raised by Barro 
(1974), of whether government bonds should be reckoned as a part of the net wealth of the 
private sector.  
 
16 The financial difficulties of both debtors and creditors, too, are referred to by Tobin as a 
channel through which deflation exerts a negative influence on aggregate demand (see 
Tobin, 1978, pp. 10-11). This aspect is further elaborated in Caskey and Fazzari (1987). 
  
to the right, the ‘reverse Pigou effect’ shifts the IS curve to the left. Whether 
aggregate demand and production rise or fall, will depend on the relative 
strength of the two effects  the traditional curvature of the LM ensuring, 
however, that the ‘Keynes effect’ becomes weaker and weaker as the price 
level and the rate of interest fall, to vanish altogether as soon as the 
‘liquidity trap’ prevails. The resulting AD curve, as drawn by Tobin (see 
ibid., p. 17), is upward-sloping at price levels corresponding to low interest 
rates, though at higher price levels and interest rates it assumes its 
traditional downward-sloping shape. If, however, as held long ago by Tobin 
himself (and many others) on empirical grounds and later argued by 
Garegnani on theoretical grounds, no decreasing relationship can be 
established between investment and the rate of interest (see section 5 
above), then the ‘reverse Pigou effect’ has no need to outweigh the ‘Keynes 
effect’ in order to cause aggregate demand to fall, this implying that the AD 
curve is upward-sloping at all price levels. 
 According to Tobin (1978, pp. 11-12), the ‘reverse Pigou effect’ 
operates under the ‘short run’ assumption that debts contracted when money 
wages and prices were higher are still in existence. If, instead, the ‘long run’ 
assumption is made that that no existing debt was contracted when prices 
were higher, then the ‘Pigou effect’ will reign undisturbed, ensuring that 
(the net wealth of the private sector denominated in money being taken as 
given) employment is the higher, the lower money wages and prices. 
 
7. Static analysis and the real-world economy  
 A dynamic theory is, in Haberler’s words, ‘a theory that explains 
how a situation grows out of the foregoing’ (Haberler, 1958, p. 250).17 As 
far as the problem of money-wage flexibility is concerned, a more specific 
reference is Tobin’s distinction between the (static) ‘price level effect’ and 
the (dynamic) ‘price change effect’ (Tobin, 1975, p. 197). What Keynes 
claims is, in Tobin’s words, that ‘declining money wage rates are 
unfavourable to aggregate demand’ (ibid., p. 195). What Modigliani 
(1944)18 and Patinkin (1948) claim (and Tobin concedes, if only as far as 
the ‘long run’ is concerned) is, instead, that lower money wages entail a 
higher aggregate demand.  
 As we have seen in section 4 above, Modigliani endeavours to 
shorten the distance between static and dynamic analysis by assuming the 
‘elasticity of expectation’ to be always unity. Patinkin’s position is different. 
He acknowledges that ‘The end result of letting the Pigou effect work itself 
out may be a disastrous deflationary spiral, continuing for several years 
without ever reaching any equilibrium position’ (Patinkin, 1948, p. 558). 
While, however, making this point consistently and as forcefully as possible 
                                                 
17 Frequent reference to expectations made by Keynes, Haberler observes, ‘has given the 
impression to many readers that the General Theory of Employment is a dynamic theory’ 
(Haberler, 1958, p. 252). What makes a theory truly dynamic is not, however, that ‘it runs 
in terms of expectations’ (ibid., p. 252), but that it endeavours to account for ‘the formation 
of expectations’ (ibid., p. 253). Although ‘Mr. Keynes has, of course, much to say’ on this 
subject, Haberler submits, ‘the dynamic aspects do not penetrate the heart of his theory’ 
(ibid., p. 253). Whatever one may think of this reading of the matter as far as ‘the skeleton 
of Mr. Keynes’s theory’ (ibid., p. 251) is concerned, it surely does not apply to Keynes’s 
treatment of money-wage flexibility. 
 
18 Though Modigliani (1944) sails most of the time in the wake of Hicks (1937), the latter 
does not pay attention to the fall in money wages as a way of increasing aggregate demand. 
This is why we took Modigliani, rather than Hicks, as our main reference.  
  
(see Patinkin, 1976, 1974 and 1987), he describes it as relevant to economic 
policy rather than to economic theory. Thus, the first part of his 1948 paper 
(sections 1 to 9) is devoted to illustrating the ‘Pigou effect’ and to stressing 
its importance in static analysis; in the second part of the paper (sections 10 
to 12) it is, instead, contended that ‘dynamic considerations invalidate’ the 
use of price decline ‘as an immediate policy, regardless of its merits in static 
analysis’ (Patinkin, 1948, p. 557).19 
 We are thus faced with an analysis which admittedly provides no key 
to current economic affairs and the policy measures to be adopted. If such 
an analysis is to be given any meaning at all, we submit, it must be believed 
to capture certain underlying tendencies of the real-world economy which, 
although temporarily outweighed by factors working in the opposite 
direction, are bound to assert themselves over a sufficiently long span of 
time  say, long enough for repayment and bankruptcies to have cleared 
the ground from debts contracted when prices were higher (as in Tobin’s 
‘long run’), and expectations of further deflation to have been superseded by 
                                                 
19 According to Kalecki, the smallness of the wealth capable of serving as a basis for the 
‘Pigou effect’ implies that the required fall in money wages and prices ‘would 
catastrophically increase the real value of debts, and would consequently lead to wholesale 
bankruptcy and a “confidence crisis.” The “adjustment” would probably never be carried to 
an end: if the workers persisted in their game of unrestricted competition, the Government 
would introduce a wage stop under the pressure of employers’ (Kalecki, 1944, p. 132). In 
static analysis, however, the size of the relevant wealth can in no case prove insufficient to 
generate full employment. This remains true, Patinkin contends, even if the fall in money 
wages and prices is accompanied by a larger fall in the money value of such assets as 
houses and shares. For (as privately pointed out to him by Milton Friedman) no matter how 
low the value of houses and shares is taken to be ‘the real value of the fixed stock of 
money,’ and thus of the overall wealth of the private sector, can be made as large as desired 
by reducing the price level sufficiently’ (Patinkin, 1948, p. 550; see also Friedman, 1948, p. 
259, note 17). 
 
more encouraging ones. No solid ground for the above belief can, however, 
be found.  
 What Patinkin says of ‘a successful anti-depression policy’  
namely, that ‘it should be able to achieve its objective rapidly’ (Patinkin 
1951, p. 272)  is, indeed, true also of the theoretical mechanism to which 
one assigns the task of securing full employment. For persistent excess 
capacity will lead to dismantlement or lack of replacement of existing 
equipment. If in the initial situation the productive capacity installed was 
sufficient to employ the whole labour force of the country (as assumed by 
Keynes), this will no more be so (see Garegnani, 1978-1979, Part I, p. 337). 
The fall in actual and potential employment, it may be added, is liable to 
have negative effects on the rate of participation, and thus on the amount of 
the labour force. And the economy will presumably change also in other, 
less predictable ways. 
 Somehow or another, the deflationary process will eventually come 
to an end, just as (if we are allowed to transplant into the present context a 
celebrated metaphor from the Tract) ‘when the storm is long past the ocean 
is flat again’ (Keynes, 1923, p. 65).20 But where the boat will have been 
carried by the wind cannot be known in advance. (If, as Fisher imagines, it 
has capsized, it will require some effort to refloat it and make it capable of 
sailing again.) 
 
 
                                                 
20 As pointed out by Ginzburg (1986, pp. 70-71, note 9), here Keynes is echoing a metaphor 
employed by J. S. Mill in his Principles.   
 
REFERENCES 
 
Barro, R. (1974): ‘Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?,’ Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 82, No. 6, November/December, pp. 1095-2017. 
 
Bellofiore, R., ed. (1986): Tra teoria economica e grande cultura europea: 
Piero Sraffa, Milano, Franco Angeli. 
 
Blanchard, O. (2003): Macroeconomics, 3rd edition, Upper Saddle River, 
Prentice-Hall. 
 
Bonifati, G. and Vianello, F. (1998): ‘Il saggio dell’interesse come 
fenomeno monetario e il saggio di rendimento del capitale impiegato nella 
produzione,’ in De Vecchi and Marcuzzo, eds. (1998), pp. 93-118. 
 
Chirinko, R. S. (1993): ‘Business Fixed Investment Spending: Modeling 
Strategies, Empirical Results, and Policy Implications,’ Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 31, No. 4, December, pp. 1875-1911. 
 
De Vecchi, N. and Marcuzzo, M. C., eds. (1998): A cinquant’anni da 
Keynes: Teorie dell’occupazione, interesse e crescita, Milano, Unicopli. 
 
Ebersole, J. F. (1938): ‘The influence of Interest Rates upon Entrepreneurial 
Decisions in Business  A Case Study’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 17, 
No.1, Autumn, pp. 35-39. 
 
Fisher, I. (1923): ‘The Business Cycle Largely a “Dance of the Dollar”,’ 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 18, No. 144, 
December, pp. 1024-1028. 
 
Fisher, I. (1925): ‘Our Unstable Dollar and the So-Called Business Cycle,’ 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 20, No. 150, June, pp. 
179-202. 
 
Fisher, I. (1932): Booms and Depressions, New York: Adelphi.  
 
Fisher, I. (1933): ‘The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions’, 
Econometrica, Vol. 1, No. 1, October, pp. 337-357. 
 
Friedman, M. (1948): ‘A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic 
Stability,’ The American Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, June, pp. 245-
264. 
 
Garegnani, P. (1978-79): ‘Notes on Consumption, Investment and Effective 
Demand,’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1978, 
pp. 335-353 (Part I) and Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1979, pp. 63-82 (Part II). 
 
Ginzburg, A. (1986) ‘Sraffa e Keynes su inflazione e deflazione,’ in 
Bellofiore, ed. (1986)   
 
Haberler, G. von (1937): Prosperity and Depression. A Theoretical Analysis 
of Cyclical Movements, Geneva, League of Nations. 
 
Haberler, G. von (1958): Prosperity and Depression. A Theoretical Analysis 
of Cyclical Movements, New Revised and Enlarged Edition, Cambridge, 
Massachussets, Harvard University Press. 
 
Harris, S. E., ed. ([1947] 1960): The New Economics. Keynes’ Influence on 
Theory and Public Policy, London: Dennis Dobson Ltd, fourth impression. 
 
Hassett, K. A. and Hubbard, R.G. (1996): ‘Tax Policy and Investment’, 
NBER Working Paper 5683, (July). 
 
Hicks, J. R. (1937): ‘Mr. Keynes and the “Classics”; a Suggested 
Interpretation’, Econometrica, Vol.5, No. 2, April, pp. 147-159. 
 
Hicks, J. R. (1939): Value and Capital. An Inquiry into Some Fundamental 
Principles of Economic Theory, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.  
 
Hicks, J. R. (1957): ‘A Rehabilitation of “Classical” Economics,’ The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 67, No. 266, March, pp. 278-89. 
 
Junankar, P.N. (1972): Investment: Theories and Evidence, Macmillan, 
London  
 
Kalecki, M. (1944): ‘Professor Pigou on the “Classical Stationary State.” A 
Comment,’ The Economic Journal, Vol. 54, No. 213, April, pp. 131-132.  
 
Keynes, J. M. (1923): ‘A Tract in Monetary Reform’, Collected Writings, 
vol. IV. 
 
Keynes, J. M: (1925a): ‘The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill’, 
Collected Writings, vol. IX, pp. 207-230. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1931): ‘The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse of 
Monetary Values’, Collected Writings, vol. IX, p. 150-163. 
 
Keynes J. M. (1932): ‘The Distinction between a Co-operative Economy 
and an Entrepreneur Economy,’ Collected Writings, vol. XXIX, pp. 76-87. 
 
Keynes J. M. (1936): 'The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money’ Collected Writings, vol. VII. 
 
Klein, L. R. (1947): The Keynesian Revolution, London etc., Macmillan. 
 
Krugman, P. R. (1998): ‘It’s Baaack!: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the 
Liquidity Trap,’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 2.  
 
Laidler, D. (1999): Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution. Studies in the 
Inter-War Literature on Money, the Cycle and Unemployment, Cambridge, 
CUP. 
 
Lange, O. (1944): Price Flexibility and Employment, The Principia Press, 
Bloomington, Indiana. 
 
Leijonhufvud, A. (1968), On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of 
Keynes, New York etc., Oxford University Press. 
 
Modigliani, F. (1944): ‘Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Interest and 
Money,’ Econometrica, Vol. 12, No. 1, January, pp. 45-88. 
 
Modigliani, F. (1963): ‘The Monetary Mechanism in Its Interaction with 
Real Phenomena,’ Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 
February, Part 2, Supplement, pp. 79-107. 
 
Musgrave, R.A. (1948): ‘Credit Controls, Interest Rates and Management of 
Public Debt’, in Income, Employment and Public Policy. Essays in Honor of 
Alvin H. Hansen, New York, Norton &Co.  
 
Patinkin, D. (1948): ‘Price Flexibility and Full Employment’, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 4, September, pp. 543-564.  
 
Patinkin, D. (1951): ‘Price Flexibility and Full Employment’, revised 
edition, in AEA, Readings in Monetary Theory, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1951, pp. 252-283.  
 
Patinkin, D. ([1956] 1965): Money, Interest and Prices. An Integration of 
Monetary and Value Theory, second edition, New York, Harper and Row.  
 
Patinkin, D. (1974): ‘The Role of the “Liquidity Trap” in Keynesian 
Economics,’ in Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 108, pp. 
3-11. 
 
Patinkin, D. (1976): ‘Keynes’s Monetary Thought: A Study in its 
Development,’ History of Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring, pp. 1-
150. 
 
Patinkin, D. (1987): ‘Real Balances’, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. 
Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London, 
Macmillan. 
 
Pigou, A. C. (1943): ‘The Classical Stationary State,’ The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 53, No. 212, December, pp. 343-351. 
 
Robertson   (1936): ‘Some Notes on Mr. Keynes’ General Theory of 
Employment,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 51, No. 1, 
November, pp. 168-191. 
 
Robertson (1940): ‘Mr. Keynes and the rate of interest,’ in Essays in 
Monetary Theory, London, P. S. King & Son, pp. 1-38. 
 
Samuelson (1961): Economics[. An Introductory Analysis], fifth edition, 
McGraw-Hill 
 
Samuelson, P. A. (1963): ‘A Brief Survey of Post-Keynesian 
Developments,’ in The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, 
vol. II, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1966, pp. 1534-1550. 
 
Samuelson (1966): ‘A Summing Up,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 80, No. 4, November, pp. 568-583. 
 
Samuelson, P. A. and Nordhaus, W. D. (1985): Economics, twelfth edition, 
New York, McGraw Hill.  
 
Shackle, G. L. S. (1946): ‘Interest Rates and the Pace of Investment,’ The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 56, No. 221, March, pp. 1-17. 
 
Schlesinger, J.R. (1960): ‘Monetary Policy and Its Critics’, Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 58, No. 6, December, pp. 601-616. 
 
Sraffa (1960): Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. 
Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, Cambridge, CUP: 
 
Tobin, J. (1947): ‘Money Wage Rates and Unemployment’, in Harris 
(1947), pp. 572-587.  
 
Tobin, J. (1975): ‘Keynesian Models of Recession and Depression,’ The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 65, No. 2, May, pp. 195-202.  
 
Tobin, J. (1978): ‘Real Balance Effects Reconsidered’, in Asset 
Accumulation and Economic Activity, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980. 
 
Tobin, J. (1985): ‘Neoclassical Theory in America’, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 75, No. 6, December, pp. 28-38. 
 
Tobin, J. (1987): ‘Fisher, Irving,’ in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman 
(eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London, Macmillan, 
pp. 369-76. 
 
White, W. H. (1956): ‘Interest Inelasticity of Investment Demand  The 
Case from Business Attitude Surveys,’ The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 46, No. 4, September, pp. 565-587. 
 
Wilson, T. and Andrews, P. W. S., eds. (1951): Oxford Studies in the Price 
Mechanism, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pubblicato in proprio 
Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica 
Facoltà di Economia 
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9 – 00161 Roma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper del Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica 
Università degli studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
Via del Castro Laurenziano 9 – 00161 Roma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO 
 
Annamaria Simonazzi (coordinatore) 
Eleonora Cavallaro 
Maurizio Franzini 
Domenico Mario Nuti 
Enrico Saltari 
Riccardo Tilli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I Working Paper vengono pubblicati per favorire la tempestiva divulgazione, in forma 
provvisoria o definitiva, dei risultati delle ricerche sulla teoria e la politica economica. La 
pubblicazione dei lavori è soggetta all’approvazione del Comitato Scientifico, sentito il parere 
di due referees. 
 
 
I Working Paper del  Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica ottemperano agli obblighi previsti dall’art. 1 del D.L.: 
31.8.45 n. 660. 
 
 
